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Abstract
Post Randomization Methods (PRAM) are among the most popular disclosure limitation tech-
niques for both categorical and continuous data. In the categorical case, given a stochastic matrix
M and a specified variable, an individual belonging to category i is changed to category j with
probability Mi,j . Every approach to choose the randomization matrix M has to balance between
two desiderata: 1) preserving as much statistical information from the raw data as possible; 2)
guaranteeing the privacy of individuals in the dataset. This trade-off has generally been shown to
be very challenging to solve. In this work, we use recent tools from the computer science literature
and propose to choose M as the solution of a constrained maximization problems. Specifically, M
is chosen as the solution of a constrained maximization problem, where we maximize the Mutual
Information between raw and transformed data, given the constraint that the transformation sat-
isfies the notion of Differential Privacy. For the general Categorical model, it is shown how this
maximization problem reduces to a convex linear programming and can be therefore solved with
known optimization algorithms.
Keywords: Post Randomization Methods, Disclosure risk, Mutual Information, Differential Privacy,
Categorical Variables.
1 Introduction
Data from census or survey studies are among the most useful sources of information for social and
political studies. However, when statistical and governmental agencies release microdata to the public,
they often encounter ethical and moral issues concerning the possible privacy leak for individuals
present in the dataset. Anonymization techniques, like encrypting or removing personally identifiable
information, have been widely used with the hope of ensuring privacy protection. However, recent
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studies by Gymrek et al. (2013), Homer et al. (2008), Narayanan and Shmatikov (2008), Sweeney
(1997) have shown that, even after removing directly identifying variables, like names or national
insurance numbers, the potential for breaches of confidentiality is still present. Specifically, an intruder
might still be able to identify individuals by cross-classifying categorical variables in the dataset
and matching them with some external database. This kind of privacy problems have been widely
considered in the statistical literature and different measures of disclosure risk have been proposed to
assess the riskiness of specific dataset.
Different disclosure limitation techniques have been proposed, like rounding, suppression of ex-
treme values or entire variables, sampling or perturbation techniques. Post Randomization Methods
(PRAM) are among the most used techniques for disclosure risk limitation. See De Wolf et al. (1997),
Gouweleeuw et al. (1997), Kooiman et al. (1997). With these techniques, before releasing the dataset,
the data curator randomly changes the values of some categorical identifying variables, like gender,
job or age, of some individuals in the dataset. In a recent paper, Shlomo and Skinner (2010) con-
sider PRAM and random data swapping of a geographical variable and propose a way of computing
measures of disclosure risk to assess whether these techniques have been effective in “privatizing”
the dataset. The choice of the geographical variable is motivated by the fact that, by swapping or
changing it, it is usually less likely to generate unreasonable combinations of categorical variables, like
for instance a pregnant man or a 10 year old lawyer. In order to implement PRAM, they consider
a stochastic matrix M , where the (i, j) entry of this matrix gives the probability that an individual
from location i has his geographical variable swapped to location j. Given this known matrix M ,
Shlomo and Skinner (2010) suggest some measures of risk and related estimation methods. However,
an open problem is to decide how the data curator should actually choose the matrix M in order to
guarantee an effective level of privacy.
Over the last ten years, a new approach to data protection, called Differential Privacy (see Dwork et
al. (2006)), has become more and more popular in the computer science literature and has been imple-
mented in their security protocols by IT companies (Eland (2015), Erlingsson et al. (2014),Machanava-
jjhala et al. (2008)). This new framework finds its roots in the cryptography literature and prescribes
to transform the original data, containing sensitive information, using a channel or mechanism Q into
a sanitized dataset. The mechanism Q should be chosen carefully, in such a way that, by only looking
at the released dataset, an intruder will have very low probability of guessing correctly the presence
or absence of a specific individual in the raw data and, therefore, the privacy of the latter will be
preserved. Differential Privacy formalizes mathematically this intuitive idea. We will provide a short
review on it in Subsection 2.3.
In this work, we bring together ideas from the Disclosure Risk and Differential Privacy literature to
propose a formal way of choosing the stochastic matrix M used in PRAM. Specifically, when choosing
M , we need to balance two conflicting goals: 1) on the one hand, we want the application of M
to make the dataset somehow private; 2) on the other hand, we also want that the released dataset
preserves as much statistical information as possible from the raw data. In order to balance this trade-
off, we propose to choose M as the solution of a constrained maximization problem. We maximize
the Mutual Information between the released and the raw dataset, hence guaranteeing preservation of
statistical information and achieving goal 2). Mutual Information is a common measure of dependence
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between random variables used in probability and information theory. In order to guarantee also
goal 1), we introduce a constraint in the maximization problem by imposing that the application M
satisfies differential privacy, therefore the resulting mechanism based on M can formally be considered
private. We show how this optimization problem results in a convex maximization problem under
linear contraints and can therefore being solved efficiently by known optimization algorithms.
The rest of this work is organized as follows. In Section 2, first we will briefly review the disclosure
risk problem in Subsection 2.1 and then the tools needed for our approach. Specifically, we review
Mutual Information in Subsection 2.2 and Differential Privacy in Subsection 2.3. In Section 3, we
formalize the proposed constrained maximization problem to choose the stochastic matrixM in PRAM
and show that this choice is made by solving a convex optimization problem under linear constraints.
Section 4 contains a simulation study showing first the effect of the Diffential Privacy constraint on
simulated data and then the effect of different choices of M using a real dataset of a survey of New
York residents. Finally, a concluding remarks section closes the work. Proofs of the statements are
deferred to the Appendix.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Disclosure Risk Limitation with categorical variables
In disclosure risk problems, we usually have microdata of n individuals, where for each individual
we can observe two distinct sets of variables: 1) some variables, usually called sensitive variables,
containing private information, e.g. health status or salary; 2) some identifying categorical variables,
usually called key variables, e.g. gender, age or job. Disclosure problems arise because an intruder
may be able to identify individuals in the dataset by cross-classifying their corresponding key variables
and matching them to some external source of information. If the matching is correct, the intruder
will be able to disclose the information contained in the sensitive variables.
Formally, let us assume we have J categorical key variables in the dataset, observed for a sample of
n individuals, collected from a population of size N . Each variable has nj possible categories labelled,
without loss of generality, from 1 up to nj . The observation for individual i, Xi = (Xi1, . . . , XiJ),
therefore takes values in the state space C := ∏Jj=1{1 . . . , nj}. This set has K := |C| = ∏Jj=1 nj
values, corresponding to all possible cross-classification of the J key variables. The information about
the sample is usually given through the sample frequency vector (f1, . . . , fK), where fi counts how
many individuals of the sample have been observed with the particular combination of cross-classified
key variables corresponding to cell i. (F1, . . . , FK) denotes the corresponding vector frequencies when
considering the whole population of N individuals.
The earliest papers to consider disclosure risk problems include Bethlehem et al. (1990), Duncan
and Lambert (1986), Duncan and Lambert (1989), Lambert (1993). These works propose different
measures of disclosure risk and possible ways to estimates them under different model choice. Skinner
and Elliot (2002), Skinner et al. (1994) review the most popular among measures of disclosure risk.
These measures depend on the sample frequencies (f1, . . . , fK) and usually focus on small frequencies,
especially those having frequency 1, called sample uniques. The individuals belonging to these cells
are those with the highest risk of their sensitive information being disclosed. Specifically, suppose
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that an individual is the only one both in the sample and in population to have a specific combination
of key variables. Then, his key variables can be matched to an external database, and therefore this
match will be perfect, i.e. correct with probability one, and his sensitive information will be therefore
disclosed.
We usually distinguish between two groups of measures of disclosure risk :
1. Record Level (or per-record) measures: they assign a measure of risk for each data point.
Among the most popular, there are
r1k = P(Fk = 1|fk = 1),
r2k = E(1/Fk|fk = 1).
(1)
k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. The first measure provides the probability that a sample unique is also pop-
ulation unique. The second tells the probability that if we select a sample unique and guess
uniformly about his identity, we pick him correctly. The first measure is less conservative and
is always smaller than the second.
2. File level measures: they provide an overall measure of risk for a dataset and are usually defined
by aggregating the record level. Popular examples are
τ1 =
∑
k:fk=1
r1k, τ2 =
∑
k:fk=1
r2k. (2)
These measures of disclosure risk are estimated using the data (f1, . . . , fK) under different mod-
elling choices. For example, Skinner and Shlomo (2008), Shlomo and Skinner (2010) consider the
estimation of these measures under log-linear models for the population and sample frequencies. Un-
der this model choice, the indexes (1) and (2), can be derived in closed form and estimated using
plug-in MLE estimators. A different modelling approach, proposed in Manrique-Vallier and Reiter
(2012),Manrique-Vallier and Reiter (2014), is to apply grade of membership models, which provide
very accurate estimates for (2). For a quite recent review on disclosure risk problems, the reader is
referred to Matthews and Harel (2011).
If the estimated values of (1) and (2) are too high, then the data curator should apply a disclosure
limitation technique to the dataset before releasing it to the public. Some possibilities are for example
rounding, suppression of extreme values or entire variables, subsampling or perturbation techniques.
See Willenborg and de Waal (2001) for a review of different disclosure limitation techniques.
2.2 Mutual Information
Let X be a discrete random variable taking values on a finite set X and having probability mass
function pX(x). The (Shannon) entropy of X is defined as
H(X) = −
∑
x∈X
pX(x) log pX(x) = −E(log(pX(x)))
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and it is a measure of uncertainty about the distribution of X. H(X) is always non-negative, takes
value 0 when pX is a point mass in one of the support points and it is maximized when pX is uniform,
pX(x) =
1
|X | ∀x ∈ X , in which case H(X) = log |X |.
Similarly, given two discrete random variables X and Z, their joint entropy is defined as
H(X,Z) = −
∑
x∈X
∑
z∈Z
p(X,Z)(x, z) log p(X,Z)(x, z),
where p(X,Z) denotes the joint mass function on X × Z. H(X,Z) measures the joint uncertainty of
X and Z taken together.
Besides the conditional entropy of Z given X is defined as
H(Z|X) = −
∑
x,z
pX,Z(x, z) log(PZ|X=x(z)) (3)
= H(X,Z)−H(X)
and quantifies the amount of information needed to describe the outcome of Z given that the value
of X is known. If Z and X are independent, the conditional entropy H(Z|X) coincides with H(Z).
The mutual information between X and Z is defined as
I(X,Z) =
∑
z∈Z
∑
x∈X
P(X,Z)(x, z) log
(
p(X,Z)(x, z)
pX(x)pZ(z)
)
where pX , pZ , p(X,Z) are respectively the marginal and joint distributions of X and Z. From the
definition of I(X,Z) it follows that
I(X,Z) = DKL(p(X,Z)||pXpZ) (4)
where DKL denotes the Kullback-Leibler divergence. Therefore, I(X,Z) measures the divergence
between the joint distribution of X and Z and the product of their marginals. From (4), it also
follows that I(X,Z) ≥ 0, and I(X,Z) = 0 if and only if X and Z are independent.
An important equality connecting the mutual information I(X,Z) with the marginal and joint
entropies is
I(X,Z) = H(X) +H(Z)−H(X,Z). (5)
This formula is the base of the so-called 3H principle to estimate I(X,Z), in which the three H
entropy terms on the right hand side are estimated from the data and plugged into (5) to obtain an
estimate ̂I(X,Z).
For a review on entropy, mutual information and their properties, see for example Gibbs and Su
(2002); Gray (2011) and references therein.
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2.3 Differential Privacy
Differential Privacy is a notion recently proposed in the computer science literature by Dwork et al.
(2006); Dwork and Roth (2014) mathematically formalize the idea that the presence or absence of an
individual in the raw data should have a limited impact on the transformed data, in order for the latter
to be considered privatized. Formally, let X1:n = (X1, . . . , Xn) be a set of observations, taking values
in a state space Xn ⊆ Rn, containing sensitive information. A mechanism is simply a conditional
distribution Q that, given the raw dataset X1:n, returns a transformed dataset Z1:kn = (Z1, . . . , Zkn),
with Zkn ⊆ Rkn , to be released to the public, where the sample sizes of X1:n and Z1:n are allowed to
be different. Differential Privacy is a property of Q that guarantees that it should be very difficult for
an intruder to recover the sensitive information of X1:n by having access only to Z1:kn and is defined
as follows.
Definition 2.1 (α-Differential Privacy, Dwork et al. (2006)) The mechanism Q satisfies α-Differential
Privacy if
sup
S∈σ(Zn)
Q(Z1:n ∈ S|X1:n)
Q(Z1:n ∈ S|X ′1:n)
≤ exp(α) (6)
for all X1:n, X
′
1:n ∈ Xn s.t. dH(X1:n, X ′1:n) = 1, where dH denotes the Hamming distance, dH(X1:n, X ′1:n) =∑n
i=1 I(Xi 6= X ′i) and I is the indicator function of the event inside brackets.
For small values of α the right hand side of (6) is approximately 1. Therefore, if Q satisfies
Differential Privacy, (6) guarantees that the output database Z1:n has basically the same probability
of having been generated from either one of two neighboring databases X1:n, X
′
1:n, i.e. databases
differing in only one entry. See Rinott at al. (2018) for a statistical viewpoint of differential privacy.
Differential Privacy has been studied in a wide range of problems, differing among them in the way
data is collected and/or released to the end user. The two most important classifications are between
Global vs Local privacy, and Interactive vs Non-Interactive models. In the Global (or Centralized)
model of privacy, each individual sends his data to the data curator who privatizes the entire data set
centrally. Alternatively, in the Local (or Decentralized) model, each user privatizes his own data before
sending it to the data curator. In this latter model, data also remains secret to the possibly untrusted
curator. In the Non-Interactive (or Off-line) model, the transformed data set Z1:n is released in one
spot and each end user has access to it to perform his statistical analysis. In the Interactive (or On-
line) model however, no data set is directly released to the public, but each end user can ask queries
f about X1:n to the data holder who will reply with a noisy version of the true answer f(X1:n).
There have been many extensions and generalizations of the notion (6) of Differential Privacy
proposed over the last ten years, in order to accommodate for different areas of applications and state
spaces of the input and output data. Among them, we mention (α, δ)-Differential Privacy (Dwork
and Roth (2014)), vertex and edge Differential Privacy for network models (Borgs et al. (2015)),
zero-mean Concentrated Differential Privacy (Bun and Steine (2016)), randomised differential privacy
(Happ et al. (2011)) or ρ Differential Privacy (Chatzikokolakis et al. (2013), Dimitrakakis et al.
(2017)), where the Hamming distance dH is (6) is replaced by possibly any distance ρ, and many
others. However, since it is not possible to review all the many extensions of Differential Privacy here,
we refer to Dwork and Roth (2014) for a quite updated review on different applications and extensions
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of Differential Privacy. To conclude this brief review, we recall one of the most important properties
of any Differential Private mechanism: post processing, see Dwork and Roth (2014). This property
guarantees that if the output Z1:n of any α-Differential Private mechanism is further processed and
gone through another mechanism (depending only on Z1:n, and not on X1:n), then the resulting output
will also be α-Differential Private. Therefore, there will be no chance of any leak of privacy simply by
post-processing the released data Z1:n.
3 An information-theoretic approach to PRAM using Differ-
ential Privacy
Post Randomization Method is a popular perturbation method for disclosure risk limitation. It is
connected to randomized response techniques described by Warner (1965). In the former approach,
the raw data are perturbed by the data holder after having being collected, while in the latter, the
perturbation is directly applied by the respondents during the interviewing process. We remind that
PRAM was introduced by Kooiman et al. (1997) and further explored by Gouweleeuw et al. (1997) and
De Wolf et al. (1997). Given raw microdata, PRAM produces a new dataset where some of entries are
randomly changed according to a prescribed probability mechanism. The randomness introduced by
the mechanism implies that matching a record in the perturbed dataset may actually be a mismatch
instead of a true match, hence making usual disclosure matching attempts less reliable.
Shlomo and Skinner (2010) consider the problem of disclosure risk estimation when the microdata
has gone through either a PRAM or data swapping process. They perturb the geographical key
variable using a stochastic matrix M , i.e. every row of M sums to one, where Mij provides the
probability that an individual from location i is changed to location j. Shlomo and Skinner (2010)
then proceed to discuss the problem of how to estimate the measures of risk presented in Subsection
2.1, but without providing any tangible rule on how to choose M , which is not the main goal of that
paper.
In this work, we propose a novel approach to choose the randomization matrix M in PRAM. Specif-
ically, we propose to choose it as the solution of a constrained maximization problem, in which we
maximize the mutual information between raw data X1:n and released data Z1:n, under the constraint
that the perturbation mechanism satisfies the Differential Privacy condition (6). Other optimization
approaches for PRAM were already considered by Willnborg (1999) and Willenborg (2000), using
different target functions and constraints. See also Section 5.5 of Willenborg and de Waal (2001).
However, these choices usually result in a difficult maximization problems and often rely on approxi-
mation methods.
We argue that the choice of Mutual Information and Differential Privacy have several advantages.
First, Mutual Information and Differential Privacy are very natural notions and popular measures of
information similarity and privacy guaranty that have been widely considered in Information Theory
and Machine Learning. Second, as it will be shown shortly, the resulting maximization problem
reduces to a convex maximization problem under a set of linear constraints, hence it can be solved
efficiently by well known optimization tools, like the Simplex method which is implemented in most of
the commonly used computational softwares, like Matlab or R. Finally, the level of privacy guaranteed
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by the proposed methodology is tuned by a single tuning parameter α, which can be chosen by the
data curator to achieve the desired level of privacy in a very simple manner. In subsection 4.1, we
will show empirically how the choice of this parameter affects the estimation of the parameters, hence
providing some evidence and guidance on how to choose it.
3.1 Model of PRAM
We propose to choose M as the solution of the following constrained maximization program
max
M satisfies (6)
I(X1:n, Z1:n). (7)
We will consider the case of randomly changing the values of a key variable with S possible outcomes,
e.g. the geographical location. Xi ∈ {1, . . . , S} is the corresponding categorical random variable,
having probabilities p = (p1, . . . , pS), and therefore P(Xi = j) = pj . We consider the class of all
randomizing matrices of the following form
M =

q1
1−q1
S−1
1−q1
S−1 . . .
1−q1
S−1
1−q2
S−1 q2
1−q2
S−1 . . .
1−q2
S−1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1−qS
S−1
1−qS
S−1
1−qS
S−1 . . . qS
 (8)
for an unknown parameter vector q = (q1, . . . , qS). This corresponds to the case in which, given that
Xi belongs to category j, then its transformed value Zi will either remain unchanged with probability
qj , or will be changed to one of the other S−1 categories, chosen uniformly at random, with probability
1− qj . Therefore, the conditional distribution of Zi given Xi is
Q(Zi|Xi) = qI(Zi=Xi)Xi
(
1− qXi
S − 1
)I(Zi 6=Xi)
.
To underline the dependency on the vector q, we will sometimes write Qq. It is easy to check that the
marginal of Zi is given by
P(Zi = j) = pjqj +
∑
k 6=j
pk
1− qk
S − 1 =: mj (9)
for j ∈ {1, .., S}. We remark that the vector m = (m1, . . . ,mS) can be computed in linear time in the
dimension S by first computing the quantity
∑S
k=1 pk
1−qk
S−1 .
In the non interactive setting that we are considering, i.e. when Zi only depends on Xi, the
conditional distribution of Z1:n factorizes and can be written as
Q(Z1:n|X1:n) =
n∏
i=1
Q(Zi|Xi).
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Plugging it into (6), the Differential Privacy condition simplifies into
sup
Zi,Xi 6=X′i
Q(Zi|Xi)
Q(Zi|X ′i)
≤ eα.
Depending on the value of Zi, the quotient
Q(Zi|Xi)/Q(Zi|X ′i) can take one of three values. If Zi = Xi, then it is equal to (S − 1)qXi/(1− qX′i).
If Zi = X
′
i, then it is equal to (1 − qXi)/(S − 1)qX′i . Finally, if Zi is different from both Xi and X ′i,
then the quotient is equal to (1− qXi)/(1− qX′i). Therefore, the privacy condition specializes into the
following set of constraints
max
(
(S − 1)qk
1− qk′ ,
1− qk
(S − 1)qk′ ,
1− qk
1− qk′ I(S ≥ 3)
)
≤ eα (10)
for any couple k 6= k′ ∈ {1, . . . , S}. We notice that this set of conditions can be expressed as a linear
constraint. Specifically,
Fact 1: There exists a matrix C and a vector bα (depending on α) such that the set of differential
privacy constraints (10) can be rewritten as the following linear constraint
CqT ≤ bα, (11)
where q is the vector q = (q1, .., qS) and ≤ denotes entry-wise inequality. C and bα are given in
Appendix.
In general, computing I(X,Z) takes of an order of |X ||Z| operations, meaning that here it should
be quadratic in S. However, due to the particular form of the matrix M considered here, this
computation can be achieved linearly in S. Let us recall from Subsection 2.2, that H(Z) denotes the
Shannon entropy of the random variable Z and H(Z|X) the conditional entropy of Z given X. To
underline the dependency on q, we denote f(q) := I(X,Z). We use the following known identity,
which can immediately be derived from (5) and (3),
f(q) = I(X,Z) = H(Z)−H(Z|X),
which leads to the simpler form
f(q) =
S∑
x=1
px
(
qx log qx + (1− qx) log 1− qx
S − 1
)
−
S∑
z=1
mz logmz
where we recall that m = (m1, . . . ,mJ) denotes the marginal distribution of Z given in (9). Let us
start by noticing that f is minimal, equal to 0, for q1 = .. = qS =
1
S . In the Appendix, we show that
f is convex in q, which, together with differential privacy constraint (11), implies that the problem
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(7) is a linearly constrained convex program, i.e. we are maximizing a convex function under a set of
linear constraints. As a consequence, the following proposition follows,
Proposition 3.1 Any optimal q solution of the program (7), lays within the vertices of the convex
polytope formed by all the feasible points.
It follows from the previous proposition that finding the optimal matrix M of general form (8)
requires finding the vertices of the feasible set. In Section 3.3 we will give some properties of this
feasible set, which might make the search faster. In the following paragraph, we will provide the
optimal M for several sub-cases of (8).
3.2 Examples
In this section we show how we can use Proposition 3.1 to give the explicit solutions of the program
(7) for several particular examples of interest.
3.2.1 Binary key variable with symmetric M
We start from the simplest case of a categorical variable with only two possible categories denoted
X = {0, 1} and symmetric M with q1 = q2 = q. We will abuse our notations by writing q both the
scalar value in [0, 1] and the corresponding two-dimensional vector (q, q)T having both coordinates
equal to this value. We are considering binary symmetric matrices of the following form,
M =
[
q 1− q
1− q q
]
.
In this setting, the Differential Privacy condition (10) specializes into
max
(
q
1− q ,
1− q
q
)
≤ eα,
which simplifies to q ∈ [ 11+eα , e
α
1+eα ]. In such a situation, the constrained maximization problem can
actually be solved analytically by derivation of the target function. However, from Proposition 3.1, it is
already known that the optimal q is among the boundaries of the feasible region. Let ψ : {0, 1} → {0, 1}
be defined as ψ(x) = 1 − x. Since ψ is one-to-one, it follows that I(X,Z) = I(X,ψ(Z)). Moreover,
by noticing that ψ(Z) has conditional distribution Q1−q, we can deduce that I(X,ψ(Z)) = f(1− q),
and therefore f(q) = f(1− q). Hence, the optimal q are both boundaries points, 11+eα and e
α
1+eα .
There are two interesting properties appearing in this simple example. First, we understand that
there are two solutions of the program. Second, these solutions are independent of p, the marginal of
X.
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3.2.2 Binary key variable with any M
The previous argument can be easily extended to the non-symmetric case,
M =
[
q1 1− q1
1− q2 q2
]
.
In this setting, the convex polytope generated by the linear constraints has four vertices, specifically
(q1, q2) belongs to the following set{
(1, 0), (0, 1),
( 1
1 + eα
,
1
1 + eα
)
,
( eα
1 + eα
,
eα
1 + eα
)}
If either (q1, q2) is equal to (1, 0) or (0, 1), then the Mutual Information I(X1:n, Z1:n) is null, since Zi
will be constant and independent of Xi. Therefore, the only optimal solutions are the two symmetric
matrices derived in the symmetric case.
3.2.3 Symmetric M
Let us now consider the case of a categorical variable with S categories and symmetric M . Specif-
ically, we consider X = {1, . . . , S} and M of the form (8) with q1 = q2 = · · · = qS . We again
abuse our notation by denoting with q both the scalar in [0, 1] and the corresponding S dimensional
vector with all entries equal to this value. The differential privacy condition (10) specializes into
max
(
(S−1)q
1−q ,
1−q
(S−1)q
)
≤ eα, which leads to q ∈ [ e−αS−1+e−α , e
α
S−1+eα ]. As before, following from Propo-
sition 3.1, the optimal q are the boundary values.
3.3 Feasible set
In our experiments, we have experienced that routine optimization functions implemented in standard
software, e.g. Matlab, can solve the optimization problem (7) extremely quickly. However, when the
number of possible categories S becomes very large, the optimization might become time consuming.
For this reason, in the following Proposition, we provide a description of all possible vectors q =
(q1, . . . , qS) that can arise as vertices of the convex polytope generated by the Differential Privacy
constraints (10) when S is large enough. This result should help to speed up the search for the
optimal vertices among all feasible points given by (10).
Proposition 3.2 For S ≥ 4, if α ≤ log(S +√S(S − 4) − 2) − log 2, then, up to permutations, the
vertices of the convex polytope formed by all feasible points are:
1. qk = vα, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , S};
2. qk = v−α, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , S};
3. qk = vikα, with ik = ±1 and 2 ≤ #{k s.t.ik = 1} ≤ S − 2, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , S};
4. q1 = vmin, qk = vα. , ∀k ∈ {2, . . . , S};
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5. q1 = vmax, qk = v−α, ∀k ∈ {2, . . . , S};
where vx =
ex
ex+S−1 , vmin =
e−α
eα+S−1 and vmax =
eα
e−α+S−1 .
Common values of α are generally within the range [0, 2], which means that the conditions of
previous Proposition are satisfied when S ≥ 10. Contrary to the symmetric case, the optimal M will
depend on p. In the following section, we will show some simulations illustrating for some values of p
which of the vertices in Proposition 3.2 are optimal.
4 Simulations
4.1 Simulation Study
We consider different simulates scenarios, where the observations X1:n are generated from a categorical
distribution with S possible outcomes, having known probabilities p = (p1, . . . , pS). In the first
scenario, we set S = 10 and consider the following vector of probabilities
p = (0.3, 0.1, 0.2, 0.08, 0.02, 0.04, 0.06, 0.1, 0.01, 0.09).
We consider the following values of α = 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, and we determine the corresponding optimal
vectors of q = (q1, . . . , qS) that solve (7). We select a sample size n = 10
4. As explained in Section
3, the Differential Privacy condition can be expressed as a set of linear constraints as in (11). The
optimal q is then determined numerically by solving the constrained maximization problem via the
optimization function in Matlab. Besides we have also generated the corresponding privatized dataset
Z1:n using the determined values of (q1, . . . , qS) for the different choices of α. The determined values
of q are reported in Table 1. From Proposition 3.2, we know that, up to permutations, there are
only 5 possible different scenarios and the qk’s may assume only 4 different values, corresponding to
vα, v−α, vmin and vmax. Hence in Table 1 we have reported the number of times the qk’s assume these
values for the different choices of α. In order to investigate the effect of differential privacy, for the four
α # vα # v−α # vmin # vmax
0.5 4 6 0 0
1 5 5 0 0
1.5 2 8 0 0
2 0 9 0 1
Table 1: Scenario I: the number of times the qk’s assume the four possible values vα, v−α, vmin and
vmax, under different choices of α.
values of α considered here, we have reported the MLE of the vector of probabilities p obtained using
the observed sample Z1:n. The results are represented in Figure 1, all the simulations are averaged
over 100 iterations. For each value of the categorical variable k ∈ {1, . . . , 10}, we have reported the
estimated pk’s, and each blue star corresponds to the MLE of pk in one of the 100 experiments. The
solid red line links the averaged estimates of the pk’s over the 100 runs, while the true values of the
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probabilities pk are represented in yellow. It is apparent that as α increases, the estimates improve
and the variability of the estimates decreases, hence the higher α, the weaker the privacy mechanism.
Figure 1 about here.
In the second scenario we have generated the data using the vector of probabilities
p = (0.0336, 0.1059, 0.1697, 0.0962, 0.0180,
0.0062, 0.1097, 0.0005, 0.1233, 0.3369).
As before we report the values of the qk’s for different choices of α in Table 2, besides the estimated
probabilities pk’s are reported in Figure 2. The simulations are averaged over 100 iterations.
α # vα # v−α # vmin # vmax
0.5 7 3 0 0
1 6 4 0 0
1.5 6 4 0 0
2 0 9 0 1
Table 2: Scenario II: the number of times the qk’s assume the four possible values vα, v−α, vmin and
vmax, under different choices of α.
Figure 2 about here.
We consider now a third scenario, in which S = 30 and we have generated the data using the vector of
probabilities p obtained as a normalization of 30 independent gamma random variables with param-
eters (1, 5), more precisely we have generated Gk ∼ Gamma(1, 5) for k = 1, . . . , 30 and we have put
pk := Gk/
∑S
s=1Gs. As before we report the vectors of q for different values of α in Table 3 and the
estimated probabilities averaged over 100 iterations in Figure 3, where again n = 104 is the sample
size.
α # vα # v−α # vmin # vmax
0.5 29 0 1 0
1 29 0 1 0
1.5 30 0 0 0
2 29 0 1 0
Table 3: Scenario III: the number of times the qk’s assume the four possible values vα, v−α, vmin and
vmax, under different choices of α.
Figure 3 about here.
In the last scenario IV, we assume again that S = 30 and we have generated the data using the vector
of probabilities p defined by
p1 = 0.05, pk = 0.95/29 for k ≥ 2.
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We report the vectors of q for different values of α in Table 4 and the estimated probabilities averaged
over 100 iterations in Figure 4, where the sample size equals n = 104.
α # vα # v−α # vmin # vmax
0.5 0 29 0 1
1 30 0 0 0
1.5 30 0 0 0
2 30 0 0 0
Table 4: Scenario IV: the number of times the qk’s assume the four possible values vα, v−α, vmin and
vmax, under different choices of α.
Figure 4 about here.
4.2 Real Data
We finally test the performance of our strategy on some benchmark datasets from the public use
microdata sample of the U.S. 2000 census for the state of New York, Ruggles et al. (2010). The
data contains the values of ten categorical variables of 953076 individuals: ownership of dwelling
(3 levels), mortgage status (4 levels), age (9 levels), sex (2 levels), marital status (6 levels), single
race identification (5 levels), educational attainment (11 levels), employment status (4 levels), work
disability status (3 levels), and veteran status (3 levels).
For ease of illustration we consider the sex variable, which has two possible categories (female or male),
therefore S = 2 and q = q1 = q2. We have already seen that the optimal q lies on the boundaries
of the interval Jα := [1/(e
α + 1), eα/(1 + eα)]. We have estimated the probabilities of the two
possible categories using the sample mean, thus obtaining p1 = 0.48 and p2 = 0.52. In our numerical
experiments we have considered α = 0.05, and for different values of q ∈ Jα we have generated the
privatized dataset Z1:n estimating p1 and p2. More precisely, in Figure 5 we have considered six values
of q ∈ [0.4875, 0.5125], and we reported the estimates of p1 and p2 averaged over 100 iterations. Each
panel corresponds to a different q, each blue star corresponds to the estimated value in one of the 100
experiments based on the privatized sample Z1:n. The solid blue line links the averaged estimates of
the pk’s over the 100 runs, while the true values of the probabilities are represented in yellow. From
the top left to the bottom right, we have chosen q = 0.4875, 0.4925, 0.4975, 0.5025, 0.5075, 0.5125: from
the theory developed in the paper it is not surprising to realize that the values on the boundary lead
to more reliable estimates, indeed they maximize the mutual information between X and Z. In Figure
6 we reported the estimated mutual information between X and Z for different values of q ∈ J0.05, in
order to do that we have estimated PZ(k) and PX(k) using the corresponding sample means for each
k = 1, 2.
Figures 5–6 about here.
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5 Conclusions and future work
In this work, we have proposed a novel approach to choose the randomizing matrix M in PRAM. This
approach applies popular tools from computer science to derive M as the solution of a constrained
optimization problem, in which the Mutual Information between raw and transformed data is max-
imized, under the constraint that the transformation satisfies Differential Privacy. The proposed
approach has the advantage to be quick and easy to implement. Also, the desired level of privacy can
be tuned by a single parameter α.
There are different ways in which the present work could be extended. A first possible direction
of research is to understand how to tune the Differential Privacy parameter α, which regulates the
desired level of privacy, using the classical measures of risk (1) and (2). Specifically, given the choice
of some model, α can be chosen in such a way that the estimate of the disclosure risk index computed
on the transformed dataset matches or falls below a particular threshold value. A second direction of
research is to generalize the proposed procedure to the case in which a few categorical variables are
jointly perturbed. The proposed methodology can be extended to this case following similar lines. In
particular, an individual will be randomly moved from one frequency cell to another using a K ×K
stochastic matrix, where K is the number of cells after cross-classifying the variables we want to
jointly perturb. In this setting, it will be important to study what further structure the K×K matrix
should have in order to avoid structural zeros combinations. Further, another direction of research is
to examine the problem using other formulations of Differential Privacy. Specifically, the definition
of Differential Privacy as in (6) is known to provide a very strong privacy guarantee. Therefore,
generalizing the proposed methodology to other formulations and relaxations of Differential Privacy,
as those mentioned in Subsection 2.1, might be an interesting topic.
Some other important research directions have also been suggested by the reviewers. Specifically, the
proposed approach is focused on perturbing categorical variables, which are usually the most sensi-
tive in terms of disclosure risk. However, a direction of research can be to study the problem for
other datatypes, possibly including also some continuous data. Another line of research is to study
theoretical guarantees in terms of preservation of utility for different classes of queries. In computer
science, with a query it is usually meant a statistics of the observations, or function of some sufficient
statistics. A crucial problem consists to quantify and analyse the expected distance (risk) of some
classes of queries computed on raw and realised dataset. Similar contributions in this direction are
Smith (2011) and Duchi et al. (2018). A useful extension of the proposed methodology would focus on
different structures for the matrix M , rather than with uniform off-diagonal rows as in (8). An inter-
esting example of application suggested by one reviewer, in which imposing non-uniform off-diagonal
rows would be important, is in spatial modelling, when perturbing a geographical variable. In this
context, a more suitable structure for M would allow for the geographical category to have a higher
probability to be swapped with a spatially neighboring category rather than to one very far from the
true observed value. Within this context, the optimal choice of M will have to balance between the
higher randomization to achieve the same level of Differential Privacy and the benefit in statistical
utility that follows from geographically localised perturbation for any later spatial analysis. Finally,
another extension could be to include all variables in the mutual information in the maximization
(7), applying privacy perturbation and the Differential Privacy constraint only to a subset of them.
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If the included and excluded variables are modelled as independent, the solution of the maximization
problem M should be unaltered. Instead, in the dependent case, the optimal solution M might depend
also on the non-perturbed variables and the maximization problem could become analytically much
more challenging.
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Appendix
5.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
To underline the dependency on q, we will sometimes use the notation Qq. We need to show that f
is convex. Let q′ = (q′1, .., q
′
S)
T and θ ∈ [0, 1]. Let k, l ∈ {1, .., S} such that k 6= l.
Qθq+(1−θ)q′(Z = k|X = k) = θqk + (1− θ)q′k
= θQq(Z = k|X = k) + (1− θ)Qq′(Z = k|X = k).
Besides,
Qθq+(1−θ)q′(Z = l|X = k)
=
1− (θqk + (1− θ)q′k)
S − 1
=
θ(1− qk) + (1− θ)(1− q′k)
S − 1
= θQq(Z = l|X = k) + (1− θ)Qq′(Z = l|X = k).
Therefore, Qθq+(1−θ)q′ = θQq + (1− θ)Qq′ . It is known that for a fixed marginal distribution of one of
the variables, the mutual information is convex in the conditional distribution of the second, see for
example Theorem 2.7.4 of Cover and Thomas (2012). Therefore, f(θq+(1−θ)q′) ≤ θf(q)+(1−θ)f(q′),
and hence f is convex.
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5.2 Fact 1: Set of feasible parameters q
We start by writing explicitly the linear constraints (11) on q. Let Tα be the convex polytope of all q
satisfying α-differential privacy. Let Sα be the planar polygon defined by the set of equations
(S − 1)x+ eαy ≤ eα (12)
(S − 1)y + eαx ≤ eα (13)
−(S − 1)eαy − x ≤ −1 (14)
−(S − 1)eαx+ y ≤ −1 (15)
eαy − x ≤ eα − 1 (16)
eαx− y ≤ eα − 1 (17)
The set of feasible points is then characterized by
(q1, . . . , qS) ∈ Tα ⇐⇒ ∀(k, l), (qk, ql) ∈ Sα.
This set characterized by the 3S(S− 1) linear constraints given by equations (12) to (17) can thus be
defined as the set of solutions of the equation CqT ≤ bα, where C has dimension 3S(S − 1)× S and
bα is a 3S(S − 1)-dimensional vector.
5.3 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Equations (12) to (15) define a quadrilateral whose vertices are
uα =
(
(S − 1)eα − 1
S(S − 2) ,
(S − 1)e−α − 1
S(S − 2)
)
,
u−α =
(
(S − 1)e−α − 1
S(S − 2) ,
(S − 1)eα − 1
S(S − 2)
)
,
vα =
(
eα
S − 1 + eα ,
eα
S − 1 + eα
)
,
v−α =
(
e−α
S − 1 + e−α ,
e−α
S − 1 + e−α
)
.
The points vα and v−α always satisfy (16) and (17). Besides, for S ≥ 4, if α ≤ log(S +
√
S(S − 4)−
2)− log 2, then uα and u−α also satisfy (16) and (17). In such a setting, equations (16) and (17) are
redundant and hence can be omitted when defining Tα. Common values of α are generally within
the range [0, 2], therefore equations (16) and (17) are omitted when S ≥ 10. In the following, we will
suppose that S ≥ 4 and α ≤ log(S + √S(S − 4) − 2) − log 2. Let (q1, . . . , qS) ∈ Tα, since (q2, q3)
satisfy (15), we have that q3 ≤ 1 − (S − 1)eαq2. Therefore, using the fact that (q1, q3) satisfy (12),
and the symmetry of the constraints, we can deduce that any (qk, ql) satisfy
y − e2αx ≥ 1 (18)
x− e2αy ≥ 1 (19)
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Equations (13) and (18) give that qk ≤ eαe−α+S−1 = vmax and equations (15) and (18) give qk ≥
e−α
eα+S−1 = vmin. Let V be the set of points defined up to permutations by
1. ∀k, qk = eαeα+S−1 = vα
2. ∀k, qk = e−αe−α+S−1 = v−α
3. ∀k, qk = vikα with ik = ±1 and 2 ≤ #{k s.t ik = 1} ≤ S − 2
4. q1 = vmin, qk≥2 = vα
5. q1 = vmax, qk≥2 = v−α.
Under the assumption that S ≥ 4 and α ≤ log(S +√S(S − 4) − 2) − log 2, it is straightforward to
verify that V ⊂ Tα. In the following, we show that any element of Tα is a convex combination of
points of V. In order to do so, we will use the following Lemma.
Lemma 5.1 For S ≥ 2, if q satisfies differential privacy, then at most one of its coordinates is larger
than vα and at most one is smaller than v−α
Proof This trivially follow from the constraint (10). Indeed, suppose that qi >
eα
S−1+eα . Then for
any other qj , using formula (19),
(S − 1) e
α
S − 1 + eα + e
αqj < (S − 1)qi + eαqj ≤ eα
Therefore,
(S − 1) 1
S − 1 + eα + qj < 1
qj < 1− (S − 1) 1
S − 1 + eα =
eα
S − 1 + eα
Similarly suppose both qi <
e−α
S−1+e−α . For any other qj , from formula (21),
(S − 1)eα e
−α
S − 1 + e−α + qj > (S − 1)e
αqi + qj ≥ 1
Therefore
(S − 1)
S − 1 + e−α + qj > 1
qj >
e−α
S − 1 + e−α

Let (q1, . . . , qS) ∈ Tα, using previous Lemma, we know that up to permutations, one of 4 settings
is possible:
1. For all k, v−α ≤ qk ≤ vα.
2. vα < q1 ≤ eαe−α+S−1 = vmax, and for k ≥ 2, v−α ≤ qk ≤ vα
3. vmin =
e−α
eα+S−1 ≤ q1 < v−α, and for k ≥ 2, v−α ≤ qk ≤ vα
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4. vα < q1 ≤ vmax, vmin ≤ q2 < v−α, and for k ≥ 3, v−α ≤ qk ≤ vα
The first setting is the most straightforward, indeed since vmin < v−α and vmax > vα, we find that
all the points (vikα)1≤k≤S for any sequence (ik)1≤k≤S ∈ {−1, 1}S , are within the convex hull of V and
so does the whole hypercube generated by those 2S points.
The second and third settings have similar proof, that we will explicit for the second setting. As
said in the previous remark, the point (vα, v−α, . . . , v−α) belongs to the convex hull of V. Let k ≥ 2,
we know that qk ≥ v−α. Besides, since (qk, q1) ∈ Sα, (12) gives that (qk, q1) is below the line passing
through (v−α, vmax) and (vα, vα). Hence, denoting θ = q1−vαvmax−vα , we find that
v−α ≤ qk ≤ θv−α + (1− θ)vα.
Therefore, we only need to show that any point
(q1, x2, . . . , xS) is in the convex hull of V for any sequence (xk)k≥2 ∈ {v−α, θv−α + (1 − θ)vα}S−1.
Let (q1, x1, . . . , xS−1) be such a point. Let (ik)2≤k≤S such that ik = −1 if xk = v−α, and ik = 1
otherwise. Now, from previous setting we know that (vα, vi2α, . . . , viSα) is in the convex hull of V,
and so does (vmax, v−α, · · · , v−α). We conclude as we notice that
θ(vmax, v−α, · · · , v−α) + (1− θ)(vα, vi2α, . . . , viSα)
= (q1, x2, . . . , xS)
The proof of the last setting is similar to the previous one. Equation (19) together with x ≥ vα and
y ≤ v−α define a triangle within which (q1, q2) lays. The points (vmax, v−α), (vα, vmin) and (vα, v−α)
are the three vertices of the triangle. Therefore, denoting θ1 =
q1−vα
vmax−vα and θ2 =
v−α−q2
v−α−vmin , we have
that 0 ≤ θ1, θ2 ≤ 1, θ1 + θ2 ≤ 1 and (q1, q2) equals
θ1(vmax, v−α) + θ2(vα, vmin) + (1− θ1 − θ2)(vα, v−α).
Let k ≥ 3, since (qk, q1) ∈ Sα, (12) implies that (qk, q1) is below the line passing through (v−α, vmax)
and (vα, vα). Similarly, since (q2, qk) ∈ Sα, (15) implies that (q2, qk) is above the line passing through
(vmin, vα) and (v−α, v−α). Therefore, qk satisfies
θ2vα + (1− θ2)v−α ≤ qk ≤ θ1v−α + (1− θ1)vα.
As previously, we only need to show that any point (q1, q2, x3, . . . , xS) is in the convex hull of V for
any (xk)k≥3 ∈ {θ2vα + (1 − θ2)v−α, θ1v−α + (1 − θ1)vα}S−2. Let (xk)k≥3 be such a sequence. Let
(ik)k≥3 defined by ik = −1 if xk = θ2vα + (1− θ2)v−α and ik = 1 otherwise. We conclude by noticing
that
(q1, x2, . . . , xS)
= θ1(vmax, v−α, · · · , v−α) + θ2(vα, vmin, vα, · · · , vα)
+ (1− θ1 − θ2)(vα, v−α, vi3α, . . . , visα).
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 1: Scenario I: estimates of the true probabilities generating the data. The x-axis encodes the
S = 10 possible categories, for each one the yellow point represents the true probability pk, while the
solid red line connects the estimated probabilities averaged over 100 iterations.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 2: Scenario II: estimates of the true probabilities generating the data. The x-axis encodes the
S = 10 possible categories, for each one the yellow point represents the true probability pk, while the
solid red line connects the estimated probabilities averaged over 100 iterations.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 3: Scenario III: estimates of the true probabilities generating the data. The x-axis encodes the
S = 30 possible categories, for each one the yellow point represents the true probability pk, while the
solid red line connects the estimated probabilities averaged over 100 iterations.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 4: Scenario IV: estimates of the true probabilities generating the data. The x-axis encodes the
S = 30 possible categories, for each one the yellow point represents the true probability pk, while the
solid red line connects the estimated probabilities averaged over 100 iterations.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 5: NY dataset: estimates of the true probabilities generating the data. The x-axis encodes the
S = 2 possible categories (female or male), for each one the yellow point represents the true probability
pk, while the solid blue line connects the estimated probabilities averaged over 100 iterations.
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Figure 6: NY dataset: mutual information as a function of q.
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